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Introduction
Changes in agri-food markets have signifi cantly affected 
the typology of agri-food value chains. (Jaffee 2003; Hen-
son and Reardon; 2005; Swinnen; 2014). Consolidation of 
the power of retailers or end-use markets, and globalisation 
of supply chains have occurred in the last two decades (Lee 
et al., 2012). Other major drivers and contributors to these 
changes include increasing competition from global market 
participants, and economies of size and scope in produc-
tion and distribution. These changes have introduced dif-
ferent forms of vertical integration and alliances, which are 
now increasingly dominating the agri-food value chain as 
opposed to the traditional (spot) agricultural markets (Kher-
allah and Kirsten, 2002).
In addition to reorganisation of supply chains, changes 
in the determination of food product safety have been 
extended to subtle characteristics that were initially clas-
sifi ed as known prior to purchase (search goods), or after 
purchase (experience goods) and those that are currently 
discerned with diffi culty after consumption (credence 
goods) (Martino and Perugini, 2006). A credence good is 
a complex, new product with quality and/or safety aspects 
that cannot be known to consumers through sensory inspec-
tion or observations in consumption. The quality and safety 
characteristics that constitute credence attributes include 
(a) food safety; (b) healthier, more nutritional foods (low 
fat, low salt etc.); (c) authenticity; (d) production process 
that promotes a safe environment and sustainable agricul-
ture; and (e) ‘fair trade’ attributes (e.g. working conditions) 
(Reardon et al., 1999).
In meeting these demands, there has been a rise in third 
party certifi cation bodies and a transition in governance 
typologies from traditional agricultural (spot) markets to 
relational, hierarchical and vertically-integrated governance 
structures. The extent of these changes have been described 
by Busch (2011) as a ‘cacophony of governance’. Buhr 
(2003) suggests there is ambiguity about the impact of infor-
mation technology and information systems on organisation 
structure. Although it has been suggested that the greater use 
of networks would eventually lead to market-like relation-
ships among fi rms, Buhr (2003) concluded that the more the 
use of inter-organisational networks, the more hierarchical 
would be the trading relationships.
This paper contends that traceability and traceability 
systems as information management tools play a moderat-
ing role in agri-food value chain governance as backed by 
the theoretical underpinning of New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) theories of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Prin-
cipal Agency Theory (PAT), Property Rights Theory (PRT), 
Network Theory (NT) and Resource Based View (RBV). 
NIE principles bridge the gap between market uncertainties 
and market assurances by determining the nature of transac-
tions through the institutions of contracts, property rights, 
conventions and authority. Contracts respond to market con-
ditions, either assisted by prevailing institutions where these 
are supportive by giving assurance, or hindered where they 
are incomplete, hence creating uncertainty (Hubbard, 1997; 
Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002).
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the theoretical 
background is clarifi ed. Secondly, the relaxed NIE assump-
tions of imperfect information, existence of transaction 
costs and bounded rationality are related to the literature on 
value chain governance structures. Thirdly, traceability is 
proposed as a moderator in mitigating the NIE assumptions 
in the context of the nature of contracts and the consequent 
adjustment of agri-food value chain governance structures, 
while promoting competitive advantage of the supply chain 
actors.
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Theoretical background
NIE recognises the cost of transacting as determined by 
institutions and institutional arrangement to be key to eco-
nomic performance (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002). These 
institutions are the institutions of contracts, property rights, 
conventions and authority (Hubbard, 1997). The rise of NIE 
was affi rmed by the acknowledgement of the role of institu-
tions and relaxes the assumptions of neo-classical economics 
of perfect information, zero transaction costs and full ration-
ality. To NIE, these assumptions are moderated as imperfect 
information, existence of transaction costs and bounded 
rationality. Some of the theories discussed under the NIE 
include transaction cost economics (TCE), property rights 
theory (PRT), principal agency theory (PAT), network theory 
(NT) and resource-based view (RBV).
The choice of these theories under the NIE framework 
and specifi c to this research relates to the considerations 
that, fi rstly, the theories from previous research have gained 
prominence in the supply chain management (SCM) dis-
course. Defee et al. (2010) audited various theories applied 
in logistics and SCM research and found that SCM research 
“is at the intersection of multiple disciplines including stra-
tegic management, purchasing, manufacturing, marketing, 
retail and logistics” (p.405). Secondly, this choice is related 
to the conclusions of Halldorsson et al. (2007) that the fi rst 
three theories answer the question of how to structure a sup-
ply chain when viewed as a collaboration between institu-
tions and the latter two ascribe what is needed to manage 
a particular internal structure of an organisation. TCE, PRT 
and PAT are typically used to identify the best organisational 
structure within institutions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1985, 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989). NT and RBV view the use 
of resources by institutions as dynamic ways of promoting 
inter-organisational relationships that are unique and com-
petitive. Thirdly, to a large extent, SCM research is derived 
from these disciplines’ theoretical paradigms. Specifi cally, 
the fi ve theories can be clustered as competitive (RBV), 
microeconomic (TCE, PAT and PRT) and systems (NT), 
which form 52.8 per cent of the theories analysed. TCE and 
RBV formed the largest number of theoretical incidences, 
of 10.4 and 8.6 per cent, respectively (Defee et al., 2010). 
Fourthly, these theories inform this research on how to struc-
ture a supply chain by ascribing what is required in each 
structure. Fifthly, these fi ve theories are based on the larger 
NIE framework that seeks to overcome the limitations of 
Neo-Classical Economics and Old Institutional Economics 
frameworks. Finally, the TCE theory, PAT and PRT elabo-
rate on particular characteristics of information asymmetry, 
uncertainty and opportunism as related to traceability, and 
asset specifi city is related to NT and RBV theory under gov-
ernance relations.
Transaction cost economics
NIE posits that institutions are transaction cost minimis-
ing arrangements. The main focus of TCE is the defi nition of 
the main structures and coordination of transactions through 
markets or hierarchies. Transaction costs are thus conceived 
as the costs of carrying out any exchange, whether between 
fi rms in a market place or by transfer of resources between 
stages in vertically-integrated fi rms. Hobbs (1996) separates 
transaction costs into three components: information costs 
that are related to information about products, prices, inputs 
and buyers and sellers; negotiation costs that arise from the 
physical act of the transaction especially in writing of con-
tracts, and monitoring costs that emanate after an exchange 
has been negotiated.
TCE relates to two main assumptions, human behaviour 
and environmental characteristics. The assumption about 
human behaviour further relates to opportunism and bounded 
rationality. Opportunism as defi ned by Williamson (1979) as 
‘self-interest seeking with guile’ recognises that businesses 
and individuals sometimes seek to exploit situation(s) to suit 
their own advantage. In as much as opportunism may not 
be prevalent, the theory however recognises it as often pre-
sent in some instances. TCE also views humans as bounded 
rational individuals who, although they may always intend 
to make rational decisions, have physically limited capac-
ity to evaluate accurately all possible decisions and alter-
natives. Bounded rationality recognises this human limita-
tion in the face of complex situations and future uncertain 
events (Selten, 1990). On the other hand, the assumption 
about environmental characteristics further elaborates asset 
specifi city, uncertainty and frequency of transactions. Asset 
specifi city was defi ned by Williamson (1985) as ‘a durable 
investment undertaken in support of particular transactions’. 
It ensures that resources in a given transaction relationship 
are not transferable to other activities (Greenberg et al., 
2008). Williamson (1989) elaborates six asset-specifi c types 
related to site specifi city, physical asset specifi city, human 
asset specifi city, dedicated assets, brand name capital and 
temporal specifi city.
The uncertainty characteristic contrasts with the perfect 
information assumption of the neo-classical economists. 
Information about the past, present and the future state is 
not perfectly known for various reasons; in such a state it 
would be diffi cult to determine ex-ante opportunistic behav-
iour as well as confi rm ex-post bounded rationality. It would 
be prudent to consider these aspects in the light of contract 
formulation for the unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding a transaction (Ji et al., 2012). Owing to uncer-
tainty, the formulation of contracts ex-ante and the ability to 
verify compliance ex-post have largely led to emergence of 
incomplete contracts. The frequency of transaction assump-
tion implies that if transactions are infrequent, then the cost 
of alternative governance structures may not be justifi ed. 
Therefore, the volume, number and/or time spread in trans-
actions are important considerations even with the previous 
assumptions. If they are infrequent, alternative governance 
structures may not be necessary.
Principal agency theory
Eisenhardt’s (1989) review of PAT was concerned in 
answering, fi rstly, the agency problem which aims at estab-
lishing the goals of the principal to the agent and the verifi ca-
tion of what the agency is doing, and secondly, the problem of 
risk sharing, especially when the principal and the agent have 
different attitudes towards risk. The focus of this theory is thus 
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to determine the most effi cient contract governing a given 
principal-agent relationship while focussing on the assump-
tions of the NIE framework. In the light of the principal not 
knowing the outcome of the agent’s behaviour, the agency 
problem presents itself in view of the agent behaving inappro-
priately, either by the misgivings of moral hazard or adverse 
selection. The solution to moral hazards and adverse selection 
in the context of simple contract is based on investment in 
information systems that would reveal the agent’s behaviour 
to the principal or by the formulation of outcome-type con-
tracts. However, a trade-off in cost occurs to the principal in 
the form of the cost of measuring behaviour and the cost of 
measuring outcomes and transferring the risk to the agent.
Property rights theory
PRT focuses on improvement in social welfare by elabo-
rating on the rights to use, to own income from, and to trans-
fer or exchange assets and resources (Coase, 1960). Property 
rights discourse highlights diverse views, especially in so 
far as claims to portions of rights are concerned. In view 
of this, the concerned parties are said to lay claim to por-
tions of rights in what Alchian and Demsetz (1973) refer to 
as ‘bundles of property rights’. PRT therefore complements 
an organisational economics approach that informs analysis 
of both institutions and governance within interrelated disci-
plines such as strategic management and economics.
The tenets of PRT stem from the argument of incom-
plete contracts as an improvement to PAT theory. NIE pos-
its that contracts are consequentially incomplete in view 
of imperfect information, bounded rationality and the 
transaction costs involved in negotiating and monitoring 
of the contract, i.e. the ex-ante and ex-post costs respec-
tively. Hart and Moore (1999) defi ne incomplete contracts 
as ‘contracts that either party would wish to add contin-
gent clauses, but are prevented from doing so by the fact 
that the state of nature cannot be verifi ed (or because states 
are too expensive to describe ex-ante)’. As a result, PAT is 
mediated by PRT with the introduction of common asset 
ownership either through joint ventures or alliances. Kim 
and Mahoney (2005) affi rmed that “the modern property 
rights theory complements extant agency theory and trans-
action costs theory by introducing ownership concepts in 
an incomplete contract setting and emphasising relation-
specifi c assets (both physical and human asset specifi city)” 
(Kim and Mahoney, 2005, p.227).
Some aspects of ownership in an incomplete contract are 
arrived at due to the limitation of measuring costs, specifi -
cally ex-post monitoring costs. Many quality attributes are 
characterised as credence attributes by buyers in the absence 
of monitoring information asymmetry arising from experi-
ence; this asymmetry increases transaction costs for down-
stream food fi rms and requires confi rmation after experience 
(Martino and Perugini, 2006). Barzel (1982) elaborated this 
emergent issue with the view that “measurement is by the 
seller, whether in advance or at the time of exchange. Quite 
often, however, measurement is automatic, or its cost is 
greatly reduced as the commodity is used. Therefore, sub-
stantial savings will result if measuring is left to the buyer to 
be performed at the time of consumption” (p.32).
This arrangement of vesting to the consumer the respon-
sibility for certainty measurement is made tenable by the 
arrangements espoused in product guarantees, warranties, 
share contracts, brand names and labels. Measurement of 
value by the consumer minimises the ex-ante, opportunism 
and uncertainty costs.
Resource based view theory
Madhok (2002) posed the questions that are most often 
raised by entrepreneurs and business partners alike. These 
include: (a) why is an activity organised within fi rms and not 
purchased from the market; and (b) why is an activity organ-
ised within a particular fi rm and not another? RBV theory 
strives to answer these questions and others. To some, the 
fi rm has been viewed from the cost aspect such as in the TCE 
theory; yet to others, the view of the fi rm has been related to 
incentives and safeguards which has yielded theories related 
to PAT and PRT. The resurgence of interest in the fi rm has 
been reviewed from the role of the fi rm’s resources as the 
foundations of the fi rm’s strategy. RBV theory is hinged upon 
the foci of the resources and capabilities of the fi rm (Skjo-
ett-Larsen, 1999). Asher et al. (2005) make the link between 
PRT and RBV theory by affi rming that fi rms have continually 
placed emphasis on their resources such as intellectual prop-
erty rights and knowledge-based resources and capabilities.
Grant’s (1991) framework through which the RBV 
approach to strategy analysis is applied entails identifi cation, 
classifi cation and appraisal of the potential of the competitive 
advantages of the fi rm’s resources and capabilities, selection 
of a strategy which best optimises these to external opportuni-
ties and, fi nally, identifi cation of resource gaps that need to 
be fi lled. While resources are appraised as factors available 
or owned by fi rms for the purpose of achieving a desired 
end, capabilities are viewed as abilities of the said resources 
to perform certain tasks. Resources and capabilities in the 
RBV theory result in competitive advantage that is boosted 
by their characteristics that are value-adding, rare, costly to 
imitate and with limited transferability (Zajac and Olsen, 
1993; Skjoett-Larsen, 1999). These are referred to as the 
strategic resources or the core competencies of a fi rm. Non-
transferability of resources can be occasioned by geographi-
cal immobility, imperfect information, fi rm-specifi c resources 
and immobility of capabilities (Grant, 1991). The ultimate 
aim of these resources and capabilities is to promote competi-
tive advantage as the degree to which a fi rm reduces its costs, 
exploits opportunities and neutralises threats (Newbert, 2008).
Network theory
Individual fi rms depend on resources controlled by other 
fi rms. Jraisat (2011) noted that network relationships create 
information sharing by enabling buyers and sellers to have 
access to resources and knowledge beyond their abilities 
through long-term relationships. NT includes three interre-
lated components: activities, actions and resources. Actors 
are defi ned by the resources they control and the incentives 
they perform; the relationships between a fi rm in a network 
arrangement generates two separate types of interactions, 
namely exchange processes and adaptation processes (Skjo-
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ett-Larsen, 1999). While the former includes exchange of 
information, goods and services, and social processes, the 
latter includes mutual modifi cations of products, administra-
tive systems and production processes in order to achieve 
a more effi cient exploitation of resources (Skjoett-Larsen, 
1999).
Adaptation processes help to strengthen the bonds 
between partners; they also signal mutual relationships that 
can be improved to increase stability. NT therefore affi rms 
the defi nition of SCM as the integration of key processes 
from the fi nal customer to the original suppliers that provide 
products, services and information that adds value for cus-
tomers and other stakeholders (Rogers et al., 2002).
Nature of contract in agri-food sup-
ply chains
From the NIE literature the need for contracts is to 
reduce uncertainties while promoting assurance (Hubbard, 
1997). Part of the challenge in all contracts is uncertainties 
in relation to incomplete contracts. Cannon et al. (2000) 
argue that when a transaction involves relationship-specifi c 
adaptations and are (a) subject to dynamic forces and future 
contingencies that cannot be foreseen or (b) involve ambigu-
ous circumstances where tasks are ill-defi ned and prone to 
exploitation, the diffi culty of writing, monitoring and enforc-
ing contracts is increased and their overall governance effec-
tiveness weakened. This happens to be the case in most agri-
cultural contracts in the wake of globalisation. In this case, 
efforts to govern geographically-dispersed relationships on 
the basis of detailed and formal contracts – without the ben-
efi t of some additional clauses – are not likely to enhance 
performance.
The nature of contract is construed to be related to aspects 
of rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Follow-
ing from human limitation in unforeseen events, information 
is said to be limited or skewed. Despite this limitation, par-
ties continue to contract to safeguard their interests as related 
to ownership rights. Ownership rights, interpreted in the 
economic sense as property, offer an effective mechanism 
for providing economic agents with appropriate incentives 
to create, maintain and improve assets (Chaddad and Cook, 
2004; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013). For these authors, 
ownership rights relate to two distinct concepts: residual 
returns (or claims) and residual rights of control. “Resid-
ual rights of control are defi ned as the rights to make any 
decision regarding the use of an asset that is not explicitly 
attenuated by law or assigned to other parties by contract” 
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004, p.349). While residual claims are 
understood as “the rights to the net income generated by the 
fi rm, i.e. the amount left over after all promised payments to 
fi xed claim holders (e.g. employees and debtors)” (Chaddad 
and Cook, 2004, p.349). Residual rights of control emerge 
from the impossibility of crafting, implementing and enforc-
ing complete contracts. Because all contracts are unavoid-
ably incomplete, it is the residual right of control over an 
asset that defi nes who is the owner of an asset (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986).
Propositions to the moderating effect 
of traceability on NIE assumptions
There is a lack of common understanding of the term 
‘traceability’ (Ringsberg and Jönson, 2010). However, van 
Dorp’s (2002) discussion of the concepts of ‘track’ and 
‘trace’ have been adopted as the main roots for the develop-
ment of the traceability concept. These provide for product 
tracking and forward and backward traceability. Kelepouris 
et al. (2007) clarifi ed the concept of product traceability 
depending on the direction in which information is recalled 
in the chain. Backward tracking relates to fi nding the origin 
and characteristics of a product from one or several criteria, 
while forward traceability is the ability at every point of the 
supply chain to fi nd the locality of product(s) from one or 
several given criteria. The defi nition by the European Union 
of traceability as “the ability to trace and follow a food, 
feed, food-producing, animal or substance intended to be, 
or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed, through 
all stages of production, processing and distribution” (EC, 
2002) is adopted in this research.
The moderating role of traceability is adopted in this 
research to mitigate partly the NIE assumptions of informa-
tion asymmetry and behavioural uncertainty while promot-
ing some level of assurance related to Barzel’s (1982) prod-
uct right guarantee. This gives the fi rst proposition that:
P1: The moderating effect of traceability may deter-
mine the nature of food governance relationships 
along the food supply chain by replacing loose con-
tractual relationships with formal and short-period 
contracts with a high information base.
Associated with the reduced asymmetric information, 
delayed rights/guarantees and transactions costs, supply 
chain management effi ciency is improved, while an indirect 
effect resulting in change in governance structures is here 
proposed. The basis of this view is the property right divi-
sion theory of Barzel (1982) which supports the idea that, 
by delayed right or through provisions of guarantees and 
warranties offered to the downstream actors and consumers, 
costs related to human opportunism, monitoring and compli-
ance, and behavioural uncertainty would be minimised to a 
large extent. Consequently, the second proposition is:
P2: Implementation of traceability systems provides 
delayed rights through an ex-post punishment mecha-
nism that binds the producer in the food supply chain 
to be charged in the likelihood of failure to comply 
with safety and standards.
Prior to implementing traceability systems, transactions 
between a given contracting company as the principal and 
contracted agents, say in an agricultural setting, were com-
pleted when agents delivered the products to the contracting 
company. The ownership of all dimensions of the products 
were transferred from the contracted agents to the company. 
When quality and safety issues arise, the contracting company 
would suffer liabilities due to the opportunistic behaviour 
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and bounded rationality of the unscrupulous agents. The con-
tracting company would eventually lose its reputation, suffer 
claims of tort liability and added costs from the losses accrued 
due to product recall. On implementing traceability system(s), 
such a simplistic principal agency transaction would be 
regarded as incomplete since the agent who supplies the prod-
ucts as per the contractual agreement still keeps ownership of 
one dimension tagged to food safety guarantee despite it hav-
ing transferred the ownership of the other dimensions of the 
products to the contracting company. It is by selling the prod-
uct to consumers, especially of credence good(s), that food 
safety and quality attributes are confi rmed upon consumption. 
It is therefore after this ex-post exchange (consumption) that 
a transaction is considered complete and hence the delayed 
right of ownership on the part of the agent persists until this 
confi rmation that was fi rst given as a guarantee is assured as 
promised. Through traceability systems, the ex-post informa-
tion revealing mechanism of the product trace leads to either 
punishment by product recalls due to non-compliance or 
reward by increased customer confi dence and trust. Trace-
ability systems would thus mitigate for ex-ante opportunism, 
bounded rationality and ex-post information asymmetry, and 
also discourage moral hazards such as misuse of chemicals.
Without traceability systems, transaction costs in defi n-
ing property rights of ‘all bundles of rights’ in food safety 
attributes would be high and incomplete since not all rights 
are clearly defi ned ex-ante as witnessed in credence goods. 
In order to control the opportunistic behaviour while facili-
tating value chain coordination, there is a need for formal 
and informal governing instruments. Traceability systems 
are thus proposed to act both as a formal legitimate rule – the 
procedure of enforcement that follows a certain normative 
requirement and fulfi ls a criterion of integration (Mueller et 
al., 2009) – while complementing the informal rules or vol-
untary standards.
Asymmetric distribution of information has been attrib-
uted as the essence of many problematic aspects of food sup-
ply. All standards, either public or private, related to food 
safety and quality have a critical information element. Carlton 
and Perloff (1989) cite the following reasons for information 
asymmetry, namely: (a) information varies in its reliability, 
hence not all information can be processed as accurate, some 
may be deemed to be inaccurate; (b) information may well 
be withheld and hence the search and collection of informa-
tion may be costly; (c) owing to human limitation, a con-
sumer can only retain limited amounts of information; due 
to bounded rationality, information is processed subjectively 
by different actors; and (d) owing to limitation in knowledge 
on the subject matter, processing information on all products 
correctly is limited due to lack of expert knowledge.
In the light of these limitations, two means of remedy-
ing information asymmetry have been appraised positively, 
especially in agricultural commodities, namely the use of 
quality labels and traceability. Raynaud et al. (2002) argued 
in favour of quality labels by asserting that consumers may 
not know automatically the quality of the products or the 
accuracy of the information supplied to them. Informed 
experts or agents would signal to the consumer on the qual-
ity of the products and hence reduce the cost of the ultimate 
consumer’s search and measurement costs.
On the other hand, Hobbs (2004) proposed the use of 
traceability systems to mitigate information asymmetry 
depending on the desired result of traceability implementa-
tion. Firstly, reactive traceability systems enable ex-post cost 
reduction after a problem has arisen. This is enabled through 
a trace-back of food to the source of contamination in what 
Coff et al. (2008) describe as the effect of traceability to 
origin or attribution and quality assurance. Secondly, Hobbs 
posits that the adoption of traceability systems is promoted 
by threats of legal action against fi rms producing unsafe food 
and the resulting damages that may result from a lack of 
demonstrable products or process trace or tracking. Resende-
Filho (2007) and Resende-Filho and Buhr (2008) highlight 
two directions that traceability as a liability function has 
taken. They state that information asymmetry on food safety 
and quality has developed due to adverse selection or with-
holding of information and problems related to opportunistic 
behaviour. As a result, a common point in promotion of sig-
nalling (Martino and Perugini, 2006) and use of traceability 
systems has been embraced with the aim of protecting insti-
tutions’ reputation and also as an incentive mechanism to 
enhance compliance among the agri-food value chain actors. 
The ability to trace products allows liability for food safety 
systems to be easily established along the supply chain while 
reducing the monitoring and enforcement costs for consum-
ers and downstream food distributors and exporters (Hobbs, 
2004). This proposition has been empirically established by 
Altal (2012) with the fi nding that consumers’ perceived risk 
was mitigated by traceability, although at a price.
Accordingly, between quality labels and traceability, the 
latter solution seems to out-weigh the former in terms of 
the challenges of limiting information. Sodano and Verneau 
(2009) envisioned three kinds of fi rms that would exploit 
the maximum benefi t of traceability systems: (a) fi rms such 
as the retailers of private quality labels and supermarkets 
will invest fewer resources against tort liability since the 
cost burden will be to the suppliers; (b) fi rms which already 
produce information could save on resources as they cover 
themselves against opportunistic behaviour in the presence 
of asymmetric information; and (c) traceability systems can 
give assurance to the third-party providers and hence reduce 
their costs through the certifi cate of origination (Jahn et al., 
2005). Traceability therefore mitigates brand proliferation 
and price discrimination.
Supply chain integration and value 
chain governance management
Supply Chain Integration (SCI) is considered as the 
degree to which a focal/lead fi rm collaborates strategically 
with its supply chain partners and collaboratively manages 
intra- and inter-organisation processes (Flynn et al., 2010; 
Maleki and Cruz-machado, 2013). The eventual goal of 
SCI is to achieve effective and effi cient fl ows of products 
and services, information, money and decisions, to provide 
maximum value to the fi nal customer.
Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) state that SCI through 
forward integration promotes the fl ow of materials and ser-
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vices while backward integration promotes sharing of infor-
mation from customers back to the suppliers. SCI indicators 
can include internal integration and external integration 
(Maleki and Cruz-machado, 2013), and product integration 
and process integration (Huo et al., 2014), while some schol-
ars have within external integration alluded to both supplier 
and customer integration (Nogueira Tomas et al., 2014). The 
focus in this paper on supply chain integration from the per-
spective of internal integration, including both product and 
process integration (Helmi et al., 2013), supplier integration 
and customer integration (Boon-itt and Wong, 2011), gives a 
third proposition that:
P3: Adoption of traceability as an information man-
agement tool can promote supply chain integration of 
suppliers, products, processes and customers.
Supply chain integration is required internally within and 
across functions and externally across suppliers and custom-
ers (Boon-itt and Wong, 2011) in order to achieve optimal 
results in traceability application. Internal integration is 
characterised by full systems visibility across functions such 
as procurement, production, logistics, marketing, sales and 
distribution; this forms the key driver for competitive advan-
tage in supply chain management (Van Hoek and Mitch-
ell, 2006). The goal of internal integration is to develop a 
process-oriented focus while concentrating on coordination 
across functional areas (Richey et al., 2010). Supplier inte-
gration promotes effective alignment, information sharing 
and participation in the interactions between fi rms and their 
suppliers requires cooperation, coordination and collabora-
tion (Moharana et al., 2012). By including joint efforts in 
product development, problem solving and technology 
exchange, among others. On the demand side of a supply 
chain, customer integration is achieved through the under-
standing of product, culture, market and organisation in such 
a way that the chain members respond rapidly to the cus-
tomer’s needs and requirements. Both supplier and customer 
integration focus on coordination and collaboration efforts 
that occur among supply chain members.
While SCI promotes performance, it also redefi nes gov-
ernance values in the way organisations interact and relate. 
Governance change is related to changing the organisations’ 
ways of doing things by way of inclusive communication, 
strong working relationships, joint accountability and senior 
management involvement. These facilitate internal integra-
tion, interdependency, common goals and objectives, com-
munication and information sharing as some of the factors 
considered to be key to the effective governance of fi rm rela-
tionships with others through external integration (Richey 
et al., 2010). Ultimately, SCI aims at promoting interde-
pendency, structures or formative relationships which are 
communicated through exchange of information, collabo-
rative alignment, profi tability and competitive advantage 
(Engelseth, 2009). In spite of the benefi ts achieved through 
SCI, discussion of value chain governance must continue. 
For instance, Denolf et al. (2015) report that information 
sharing cannot be explained solely by governance structures; 
information systems as information tools can affect the 
nature of governance structures.
The emergent new approaches to supply chain value man-
agement are largely based on allocation of resources to core 
competencies and an increasing trend towards outsourcing 
and sub-contracting of non-core functions. This has resulted 
in a general loss of control over the stages of the produc-
tion and distribution processes, especially to geographically 
dispersed regions. Vurro et al. (2009) broadened the concept 
of value chain governance from inter-fi rm relationships to 
global fora due to the coincidence of falling regulatory bar-
riers to international trade, advances in communication tech-
nologies and declining transportation costs. This approach 
also led to the review of Coase’s discourse on a fi rm’s opera-
tions and governance as based on TCE.
Gereffi  (1994, 2001) highlights the typologies of 
buyer-driven versus producer-driven forms of governance. 
Producer-driven commodity chains are found in capital-
intensive sections that require a huge capital outlay; while 
buyer-driven governance relates to retailers or markets pro-
viding the leading role in managing the supply chains. The 
role of the lead fi rm is considered a key factor in coordina-
tion of activities, goods/services and information along the 
supply chain (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Gibbon et al., 2008).
Gereffi  et al. (2005) reported that, owing to the wide 
range of inter-fi rms governance types in the global industries 
there is the recognition of the complexity of inter-fi rms rela-
tionships in the global economy. To them, “the key insight 
is that coordination and control of global scale production 
systems, despite their complexity, can be achieved without 
direct ownership” (p.81). The view of governance as coordi-
nation emphasises global value chains compared to the view 
of governance as a driver that is based on the understanding 
of global commodity chains. This nuance points to the value 
dimension of the coordination.
Gereffi  et al. (2005) added three distinct types of modu-
lar, relational and captive governance forms to William-
son’s categories of markets and hierarchies. This typology is 
based on three determinants (a) the complexity of informa-
tion and knowledge transfer; (b) codifi cation of information 
and knowledge transmitted to actors in a transaction; and (c) 
the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation 
to the requirements of the transactions (Gereffi  et al., 2005; 
Gibbon et al., 2008) (Table 1).
Global food supply chain systems seem to combine all the 
four aforementioned characteristics of governance. Martino 
and Perugini (2006) contextualise the need for a proper gov-
ernance of food supply chains in relation to factors related to 
food quality and safety. To them, the subject of food safety 
Table 1: key determinants of global value chain governance.
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is situated in relation to the provisions of TCE theory and 
its relevance to food safety, quality, information asymme-
try, uncertainty, opportunism and governance structures. 
They characterised food safety as products with a typical 
asymmetric information pattern regarding the upstream and 
downstream supply chain actors, where poor quality is pun-
ished by the market while lack of safety may involve legal 
sanctions. The main motivation for quality assurance strate-
gies is to create quality differentiation, increase consumers’ 
trust and reduce exposure to risk of food safety incidents and 
subsequent liability cases (Hatanaka et al., 2005).
However, these alternative strategies come at an added 
cost that is normally passed on to the consumer. Despite the 
additional cost for quality, the underlying character of quality 
assurance is the aim of giving information on conformance; 
from this reality, one draws the inferences that (a) informa-
tion issues have an impact on product and process quality 
in the agri-food chain; (b) greater information shortages are 
correlated to stronger integration of supply chain members; 
and (c) enhanced traceability reduces information costs for 
consumers arising from quality verifi cation. As such, the key 
determinants of complexity of transaction, ability to codify 
transactions and capability of the supply base as affected 
by traceability may be viewed to be high and hence work 
towards modular type of governance with a low degree of 
explicit coordination and power asymmetry.
Discussion
The New Institutional Framework offers a platform for 
broadening the agricultural development agenda related to 
the moderating role of traceability and the eventual value 
chain governance structures adjustments in agri-food chains. 
The supply chain as a key operational objective of traceabil-
ity is related to provision of critical information regarding 
quality and safety of food, origin and quality assurance, con-
trol and governance. The moderating effect of traceability 
in the entire supply governance structure is proposed, albeit 
theoretically, to further the discourse that (a) agri-food value 
chain governance has changed from loose contractual rela-
tionships that previously relied largely on trust and were 
governed by spot markets to implementation of formal short-
period contracts largely relying on high information base and 
lean processes; (b) traceability systems act both as a formal 
legitimate rule while complementing the informal rules in 
the food supply chain governance through the promotion of 
delayed rights, especially for credence goods; (c) adoption 
of traceability systems gives assurance to third party certi-
fi cation agencies about the certifi cation of origin of traced 
products and hence reduces the costs and duplicity; and (d) 
adoption of traceability as an information management tool 
may promote supply chain integration of suppliers, products, 
processes and customers.
In terms of policy development, the NIE approach is to 
understand the need of institutions through which knowledge 
is discovered and employed to facilitate the coordination of 
economic activity. The costs of these institutional arrange-
ments, together with the technology employed, determine 
the total costs of production and transaction and so help to 
determine competitiveness. Where information and knowl-
edge acquisition can be made easily accessible, transaction 
costs are lowered and competition increased, ultimately sup-
porting the demands of both the developing economies and 
developed economies in their fi nancial needs and quality and 
safe products respectively.
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